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We study how changes in the information available to the players of a symmetric common-value 
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then the value of Public information is positive (negative). Moreover, if players' cost of effort 
(value) is state independent, then players' effort decreases (increases) with the level of 
information. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Tullock Contests, Common-Values, Value of Public Information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1Departamento of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev 
2Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
3Departamento of Economics, University of Haifa 
 
 
*Einy acknowledges financial support of the Israel Science Foundation, grant 648/2. Moreno	  acknowledges	  financial	  support	  from	  the	  Ministerio	  de	  Ciencia	  e	  Innovación,	  grant	  ECO2011-­‐29762.	  
1 Introduction
We study how changes in the information available to the players of a symmetric
common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information a¤ect their incentives to
exert e¤ort and their payo¤s. In a Tullock contest see Tullock (1980) a players
probability of winning the prize is the ratio of the e¤ort he exerts and the total e¤ort
exerted by all players. In a symmetric common-value contest with incomplete infor-
mation players have a common state dependent value for the object and a common
state dependent cost of e¤ort, and all players have the same information.
There are a variety of economic settings (rent-seeking, innovation tournaments,
patent races) in which agents face a game strategically equivalent to a Tullock contest
see Baye and Hoppe (2003). Tullock contests may also arise by design, e.g., in sport
competition, internal labor markets see Konrad (2008) for a general survey; also,
see Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) for alternative axiomatizations of
Tullock contests.
In our model, playersuncertainty about their value and cost is described by a
probability space, and playersinformation is described by a subeld of the eld on
which players common prior is dened. We show that if players cost of e¤ort is
a twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and convex function in every state, then
the contest has a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric. Einy et al. (2013) have
recently established a general existence theorem for Tullock contests with incomplete
information when the probability space describing player information is nite, and
have provided conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium see also Wasser (2013) on the
issue of existence of equilibrium, and Ewerhart and Quartieri (2013) on the issue of
uniqueness of equilibrium. These results do not apply to our setting, in which both
the set of the states of nature and the players information eld are unrestricted.
Moreover, we show that the unique equilibrium is symmetric, a property that greatly
simplies our analysis.
For the class of contests on which the cost function has the properties required for
our existence theorem to apply, in which equilibrium is unique and symmetric, the
question how the playerse¤orts and payo¤s change when the information available
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to them changes is well posed. We are able to provide an answer to this question
when the playerscost of e¤ort is a multiplicative function, that is, when the players
cost of e¤ort is the product of a random variable and a real valued function d on the
players e¤ort. A function d identies a class of symmetric common-value Tullock
contest with incomplete information that di¤er on the two random variables identify-
ing the playersvalue for the prize and the random component of their cost of e¤ort,
and on the subeld identifying the information available to the players. Changes
in the level of information are represented as changes in the subeld describing the
playersinformation.
Following Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2003), given a function d and any two
random variables describing the playerscommon value (v) and common cost (w),
which are the uncertain elements of the contest, we dene a binary relation that ranks
information elds according to the level of information they contain: an information
eld H is more informative than some other information eld G if the predictions of
the value and cost are the same whether players information is given by H or it is
given by the aggregate information in G and H.
We dene two auxiliary real-value functions (S and U) that for any pair of random
variables (v; w) provide the playersexpected e¤ort and payo¤, respectively, in the
unique equilibrium (which we show is symmetric) of the corresponding contest when
playersinformation eld is that where the common prior is dened. The restrictions
of the functions S and U to the subset of positive constant random variables (which we
denote by D and F ) may be regarded as functions dened on R2++. The curvature of
these functions determine the e¤ect on incentives and payo¤s of the added exibility
(commitment) that more (less) information introduces in the game: ifD (respectively,
F ) is convex, then the playerse¤ort (payo¤) increases with the level of information,
whereas ifD (F ) is concave, then the playerse¤ort (payo¤) decreases with the level of
information. Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2003)s prove this result as an application
of Jensens inequality.
In our setting, the curvatures of the functions D and F are determined by the
function d. Moreover, the function d also determines players Arrow-Pratt relative
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measure of risk aversion. Using our results relating the curvature of the auxiliary
functions mentioned above and the e¤ect of changes of information in e¤orts and
payo¤s, we show that when the playersArrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion
implied by d is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is pos-
itive (negative) in every symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete
information in the class dened by the function d. Moreover, if the cost of e¤ort is
independent of the state of nature, then the playerse¤ort decreases with the level
of information when their Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is increasing.
And if the value of the prize is independent of the state of nature, then the play-
erse¤ort increases with the level of information when their Arrow-Pratt measure of
relative risk aversion is decreasing.
An interesting implication of our results is that when playerse¤orts are monetary,
i.e., the function d is linear, the value of information is zero, and playerse¤ort is
invariant to changes in players information. In contrast, when the players have
a convex quadratic cost function, then their Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk
aversion is increasing, and the value of information is positive. Thus, if the cost of
e¤ort is independent of the state of nature, then players exert less e¤ort the better
informed they are. It is not di¢ cult, however, to nd examples in which the cost of
e¤ort is state-dependent, and players exert more e¤ort the better informed they are
see Example 1 in Section 4.
The value of information in Tullock contests has been seldom studied in the liter-
ature. Denter, Morgan and Sisak (2011) study the e¤ect of mandated transparency
policy on lobbying, and identify conditions under which it leads to an increase in
e¤orts. Their setting is a two-player Tullock contest with private values and one-
sided incomplete information. Morath and Münster (2013), and Kovenock, Morath
and Münster (2013) study the incentives for information acquisition and information
sharing, respectively, in all-pay auction contests. Of course, there is a large literature
studying the value of information and the incentives for information acquisition in
auctions.
3
2 Common-Value Tullock Contests
A group of players N = f1; :::; ng; with n  2; compete for a prize by choosing a
level of e¤ort in R+. There is uncertainty about the playerscommon value of the
prize and each players cost function. This uncertainty is described by a probability
space (
;F ; p); where 
 is the set of states of nature, F is a -eld of subsets of 
;
and p is -additive probability measure on F . We interpret p as the playerscommon
prior belief about the realized state of nature. The value of the prize is described
by an integrable function v : 
 ! R++: The cost function of each player i 2 N is
described by a function ci : 
  R+ ! R+ such that for every integrable function
si : 
! R+ the function ci(; si()) is integrable. The private information about the
state of nature of player i 2 N is described by a -subeld Fi of F ; that is, given
an event A 2 Fi, player i knows whether the realized state of nature is a member of
A. A common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information is thus a collection
T = (N; (
;F ; p); v; c1:::; cn;F1; :::;Fn):
Associated with a common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information
T = (N; (
;F ; p); v; c1:::; cn;F1; :::;Fn) is a Bayesian game G(T ) = (N; (
;F ; p);Rn+;
u1; :::; un;F1; :::;Fn); to which we refer as the Tullock Bayesian game associated with
T , in which the set of actions of each player is R+, and the payo¤ function of each
player i 2 N is ui : 
 Rn+ ! R given for every ! 2 
 and x 2 Rn+nf0g by
ui(!; x) =
xi
x
v(!)  ci (!; xi) ; (1)
where x  PNk=1 xk; and by ui(!; 0) = i(!)v(!)   ci (!; 0) ; where (!) 2 n: (We
assume that when players exert no e¤ort the prize is allocated using some predeter-
mined state-dependent probability vector (!) 2 n. As we show in the Appendix,
the values of  are inconsequential.) In this game a pure strategy of player i 2 N is
an integrable Fi-measurable function si : 
 ! R+ that species player is e¤ort in
each state of nature following the observation of his private information. We denote
by Si the set of all pure strategies of player i, and by S = S1 :::Sn the set of pure
strategy proles.
Given a strategy prole s = (s1; :::; sn) 2 S; we denote by s i the prole obtained
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from s by suppressing the strategy of player i 2 N: Also, if X is an integrable random
variable on (
;F ; p) and G is a -subeld of F , we write E[X j G] for the conditional
expectation of X with respect to G. A prole of strategies s = (s1; :::; sn) 2 S is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of G(T ) if for every i 2 N; every si 2 Si; and almost all
! 2 
;
E[ui(; s ()) j Fi](!)  E[ui(; s i () ; si ()) j Fi](!): (2)
It is easy to see, e.g., Remark 2.1 in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2003), that s 2 S
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if for every i 2 N and every si 2 Si
E[ui(; s ())]  E[ui(; s i () ; si ())]: (3)
Throughout the paper we restrict attention to pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria.
3 Symmetric Common-Value Tullock Contests
A symmetric common-value Tullock contests with incomplete information, i.e., a con-
tests in which all players have the same cost function and the same information, may
be described by a collection T = (N; (
;F ; p); v; c;G); where c is the cost function of
every player, and G is a -subeld of F describing the information of every player. We
refer to G(T ) as a symmetric Tullock Bayesian game associated with T . Our rst re-
sult establishes conditions implying that a Tullock game with symmetric information
has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. Let T = (N; (
;F ; p); v; c;G) be a symmetric common-value Tullock
contest with symmetric information. Assume that for all ! 2 
; c(!; ) is twice
di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and convex, and satises c(!; 0) = 0. Then the
game G(T ) has a unique (pure strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibrium s. Moreover, s
is symmetric, i.e., s1 = s

2 = ::: = s

n.
Proof: For every ! 2 
 dene the n-person complete information game G(!; T ) in
which the set of pure strategies of every player is R+ and the payo¤ function of each
player i 2 N; hi(!; ) : Rn+ ! R+; is given for x 2 Rn+ by
hi(!; x) = E[ui(; x) j G](!):
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The game G(!; T ) has a unique Nash equilibrium t(!) = (t1(!); :::; t

n(!)), which is
symmetric, i.e., t1(!) = t

2(!) = ::: = t

n(!): (We establish this result in the Appendix
along the lines of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997)s Theorem 1.) We show that
the strategy prole s 2 S given for ! 2 
 by s(!) = t(!) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the symmetric Tullock Bayesian game G(T ): We rst show that s is
a G-measurable function. Dene the correspondence H : 
! 2Rn+ by
H(!) = ft 2 Rn+ j t is a Nash equilibrium of G(!; T )g.
We show that the graph of the correspondence H is measurable with respect to the
product -eld G
B(Rn+); where B(Rn+) is the -eld of Borel subsets of Rn+: For all
r 2 Rn+ let
J(r) = f(!; x) 2 
 Rn+ j hi(!; x)  hi(!; x i; ri) for all i 2 Ng.
Since for all i 2 N and all x 2 Rn+ the function hi(; x) is G-measurable, and since
for all ! 2 
 the prole 0 2 Rn+ is not a Nash equilibrium of G(!; T ), then hi(!; ) is
continuous on the set fx 2 Rn+ j (!; x) 2 J(r)g. Therefore the set J(r) is G
B(Rn+)-
measurable for all r 2 Rn+: Now, the graph of the correspondence H is
graph(H) =
\
r2Rn+
J(r) =
\
r2Qn+
J(r);
where Qn+ is the set of n-tuples of rational numbers. Since Qn+ is countable, then
graph(H) is G
B(Rn+)-measurable. Thus, by the Measurable Selection Theorem 
see Aumann (1969) and Hildenbrand (1974)s Theorem 1 (page 54) there exists a G-
measurable function  : 
! Rn+ such that (!) 2 H(!) for almost all ! 2 
. Since
for all ! 2 
 the set H(!) is a singleton (because G(!; T ) has a unique equilibrium),
then (!) = t(!) = s(!) for almost all ! 2 
, and therefore s is a G-measurable
function.
Now for i 2 N and si 2 Si we have
E[ui(; s()) j G](!)  E[ui(; (s i(); si())) j G](!)
for almost every ! 2 
, and therefore
E[ui(; s())]  E[ui(; (s i(); si()))]:
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Hence s is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game G(T ):
Uniqueness and symmetry follows from the fact that for all ! 2 
 the prole
t(!) 2 Rn+ is the unique Nash equilibrium of G(!; T ), and t1(!) = t2(!) = ::: =
tn(!). 
4 The E¤ect of Information on Payo¤s and E¤ort
In this section we study the value of public information, and the e¤ect of information
on players e¤ort, in the class of symmetric common-value Tullock contests with
incomplete information in which the players cost function is multiplicative. Let
d : R+ ! R+ be a twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and convex function. Denote
by T (d) the set of all symmetric common-value Tullock contests with incomplete
information (N; (
;F ; p); v; c;G) such that the cost function c satises for all (!; x) 2

 R+
c(!; x) = w(!)d(x);
where w is some non-negative integrable real-valued function on (
;F ; p), and G is a
-subeld of F . Thus, a symmetric common-value Tullock contests with incomplete
information T 2 T (d) is dened by pair of non-negative integrable functions (v; w)
and a -subeld of F .
Any pair of non-negative integrable functions (v; w) induces a binary relation on
the family of all -subeld of F as follows: If G and H are two -subelds of F , then
H % G , fE(v j H) = E(v j G _ H) and E(w j H) = E(w j G _ H)g:
(Here G _ H is the smallest -subeld of F that contains both G and H.) The
interpretation of the binary relation % is simple: H % G if and only if the predictions
of the common value and the cost function (the uncertain elements of the contest) are
the same whether players information is given by H or it is given by the aggregate
information in G and H (i.e., by G _ H).
Let T = (N; (
;F ; p); v; wd;G) 2 T (d). By Theorem 3.1 the Bayesian game G(T )
has a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric. Denote by sG the strategy played by
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every player in equilibrium, and by uG the equilibrium payo¤ of every player. We
say that the value of public information in T = (N; (
;F ; p); v; wd;G) is positive
(negative) if for every contest T 0 = (N; (
;F ; p); v; wd;H),
H % G ) E(uH)  E(uG) (E(uH)  E(uG)).
Also, we say that playerse¤ort increase (decrease) with the level of information in
T = (N; (
;F ; p); v; wd;G) 2 T (d) if for every T 0 = (N; (
;F ; p); v; wd;H),
H % G , E(sH)  E(sG) (E(sH)  E(sG)).
Let the functions S; U : L1+(
;F ; p)  L1+(
;F ; p) ! R be given for each (v; w) 2
L1+(
;F ; p) L1+(
;F ; p) by
S(v; w) = E(sF);
and
U(v; w) = E(uF):
The functions S and U identify the expected equilibrium e¤ort and payo¤, respec-
tively, in every contest T = (N; (
;F ; p); v; wd;F) 2 T (d). Let the functions
D;F : R2++ ! R be given for each (a; b) 2 R2++ by
D(a; b) = S(a1
; b1
); (4)
and
F (a; b) = U(a1
; b1
): (5)
The functions S and F identify the expected equilibrium e¤ort and payo¤, respec-
tively, in every contest T = (N; (
;F ; p); a1
; (b1
) d;F).
Proposition 4.1 establishes conditions identifying the e¤ect of information on play-
erse¤ort and payo¤ for a contest T 2 T (d). The proof of Proposition 4.1 is identical
to that of Proposition 3.3 in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2003), and therefore is
omitted.
Proposition 4.1. Let d : R+ ! R+ be a twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and
convex function, and let T = (N; (
;F ; p); v; wd;G) 2 T (d) be a symmetric common-
value Tullock contest with incomplete information.
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(4.1.1) If the function D dened in (4) is convex (concave) on R2++, then e¤ort
increases (decreases) with the level of information in T .
(4.1.2) If the function F dened in (5) is convex (concave) on R2++, then the
value of public information in T is positive (negative).
Proposition 4.2 identies a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the function F
to be either concave or convex.
Proposition 4.2. Let d : R+ ! R+ be a twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and
convex function. The function F dened in (5) is convex (concave) on R2++ if and
only if Faa(a; b)  0 (Faa(a; b)  0) for all (a; b) 2 R2++:
Proof. Let (a; b) 2 R2++:Write s(a; b) for the strategy of each player in the unique
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the gameG(T ); where T = (N; (
;F ; p); a1
; (b1
) d;F).
Then
F (a; b) =
a
n
  bE(d(s(a; b)));
It is easy to see that s is homogeneous of degree zero on R2++, i.e., s(a; b) = s(a; b)
for all  2 R++: Hence
F (a; b) = F (a; b);
i.e., F is homogeneous of degree one on R2++. By Eulers Theorem
F (a; b) = aFa(a; b) + bFb(a; b):
Di¤erentiating with respect to a on both sides on this equation and simplifying yields
aFaa(a; b) + bFba(a; b) = 0: (6)
Likewise
aFab(a; b) + bFbb(a; b) = 0: (7)
Hence
a2Faa(a; b) = b
2Fbb(a; b); (8)
and therefore
Faa(a; b)  0, Fbb(a; b)  0:
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Further, (6) and (7) imply
Faa(a; b)Fbb(a; b)  Fab(a; b)Fba(a; b) = 0: (9)
Thus, the eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix of F are non-negative (non-positive)
when Faa is a non-negative (non-positive) function on R2++: 
Let u : R+ ! R be a twice di¤erentiable increasing and concave function. If u
is an individuals von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, then his Arrow-Pratt
measure of relative risk aversion is given for all x 2 R+ by
Ru(x) =  xu
00(x)
u0(x)
:
In a asymmetric common-value Tullock contests with incomplete information T =
(N; (
;F ; p); v; wd;G) 2 T (d) a players utility if he wins the prize is u(; xi) =
v()   w()d(xi), and it is u(; xi) =  w()d(xi) if he does not win the price. Hence
playersArrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is determined by the function
d independently of the state, and is given for all x 2 R+ by R d(x).
Our next result establishes a relationship between the behavior of the Arrow-Pratt
measure of relative risk-aversion implied by the function d and the value of public
information.
Theorem 4.3. Let d : R+ ! R+ be a thrice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and
convex function, and let T = (N; (
;F ; p); v; wd;G) 2 T (d) be a symmetric common-
value Tullock contest with incomplete information. If the playersArrow-Pratt mea-
sure of relative risk aversion R d is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public
information in T is positive (negative).
Proof. Assume thatR d(x) is an increasing function, and let T = (N; (
;F ; p); v; c;G) 2
T (d). By Proposition 4.2 it su¢ ces to show that Faa(a; b)  0 for all (a; b) 2 R2++,
where F is the function dened in (5). For (a; b) 2 R2++,
F (a; b) =
a
n
  bE(d(s(a; b))); (10)
10
where s(a; b) is the strategy of each player in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the game G(T ), with T = (N; (
;F ; p); a1
; (b1
) d;F). Let
g(a; b) = d(s(a; b)):
Then
F (a; b) =
a
n
  bE(g(a; b));
and therefore
Faa(a; b) =  bE(gaa(a; b)):
We show that E(gaa(a; b))  0: Di¤erentiating g we get
ga(a; b) = d
0(s(a; b))sa(a; b)
and
gaa(a; b) = d
00(s(a; b)) (sa(a; b))
2 + d0(s(a; b))saa(a; b): (11)
Since s(a; b) maximizes E[ui(; (s i(); si())) j G], it satises the rst order condition
E[
a (n  1)
n2s(a; b)
j G](!) = bE[d0(s(a; b)) j G](!)
for all ! 2 
: Since s(a; b) is G-measurable, then
s(a; b)d0(s(a; b)) =
n  1
n2b
a: (12)
Therefore
(sd0(s))0 (a; b)sa(a; b) =
n  1
n2b
;
i.e.,
sa(a; b) =
n  1
n2b (sd0(s))0 (a; b)
(13)
Di¤erentiating this expression we get
saa(a; b) =  n  1
n2b
(sd0(s))00 (a; b)sa(a; b) 
(sd0(s))0 (a; b)
2 : (14)
Therefore
saa(a; b)  0, (sd0(s))00 (a; b)sa(a; b)  0: (15)
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By (11) and (14),
gaa(a; b) = d
00(s(a; b)) (sa(a; b))
2   n  1
n2b
d0(s(a; b)) (sd0(s))00 (a; b)sa(a; b) 
(sd0(s))0 (a; b)
2 :
Hence gaa(a; b)  0 if and only if
d00(s(a; b)) (sa(a; b))
2  n  1
n2b
d0(s(a; b)) (sd0(x))00 (a; b)sa(a; b) 
(sd0(s))0 (a; b)
2
=
d0(s(a; b)) (sd0(x))00 (a; b)
(sd0(s))0 (a; b)
sa(a; b)
n  1
n2b (sd0(s))0 (a; b)
=
d0(s(a; b)) (sd0(s))00 (a; b)
(sd0(s))0 (a; b)
(sa(a; b))
2 ;
where the last expression is obtained by replacing sa(a; b) from equation (13). Hence
gaa(a; b)  0 , d
00(s(a; b))
d0(s(a; b))
  (sd
0(x))00 (a; b)
(sd0(x))0 (a; b)
 0
, (ln d0(s(a; b)))0    ln (sd0(s))0 (a; b)0  0
,

ln
(sd0(s))0 (a; b)
d0(s(a; b))
0
 0
,

(sd0(s))0 (a; b)
d0(s(a; b))
0
 0
,

1 +
s(a; b)d00(s(a; b))
d0(s(a; b))
0
 0
, (R d(s(a; b)))0  0: 
Our next result concerns the e¤ect on playerse¤ort of changes in the level of
information.
Proposition 4.4. Let d : R+ ! R+ be a thrice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing
and convex function, and let T = (N; (
;F ; p); v; wd;G) 2 T (d) be a symmetric
common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information.
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(4.4.1) If w is constant on 
 and (xd0(x))00  0 ( (xd0(x))00  0) for all x 2 R+,
then playerse¤ort increases (decreases) with the level of information in T .
(4.4.2) If v is constant on 
 and (xd0(x))00  0 for all x 2 R+, then players
e¤ort increases with the level of information in T .
Proof. We prove (4.4.1). W.l.o.g. assume that w() = 1 on 
. Let a 2 R++ and
let s(a; 1) be the pure strategy played by every player in the unique equilibrium of
G(T ); where T = (N; (
;F ; p); a1
; 1
d;F). Let D(a) := D(a; 1) = E(s(a; 1)). Then
D00(a) = E(saa(a; 1)): Since sa(a; 1) > 0 by (13), then (xd0(x))
00  0 (respectively,
(xd0(x))00  0) implies saa(a; 1)  0 (respectively, saa(a; 1)  0) by (15), and therefore
D00(a)  0 (respectively, D00(a)  0). Hence playerse¤ort increase (decrease) with
the level of information in T by Proposition 4.1.1.
We prove (4.4.2). W.l.o.g. assume that v() = 1 on 
. Let D^(b) := D(1; b) =
E(s(1; b)). Then D^00(b) = E(sbb(1; b)): Di¤erentiating equation (12) with respect to b
and using a = 1 yields
sb(1; b) =  n  1
n2
1
(sd0(s))0 (1; b)
1
b2
< 0:
Di¤erentiating this expression we get
sbb(1; b) =  n  1
n2

  2
b3
1
(sd0(s))0 (1; b)
  1
b2
(sd0(s))00 (1; b)sb(1; b)
[(sd0(s))0 (1; b)]2

=
n  1
n2
1
b2
1
(sd0(s))0 (1; b)

2
b
+
(sd0(s))00 (1; b)sb(1; b)
(sd0(s))0 (1; b)

:
Therefore (sd0(s))00 (1; b)  0 implies sbb(1; b)  0 and hence D^00(b)  0: Thus, players
e¤ort increases with the level of information in T by Proposition 4.1.1. 
When the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is increasing (decreasing)
and the playerscost of e¤ort (value) is independent of the state of nature, we can
evaluate the impact of changes in the level of information on playerse¤ort.
Proposition 4.5. Let d : R+ ! R+ be a thrice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing
and convex function, and let T = (N; (
;F ; p); v; wd;G) 2 T (d) be a symmetric
common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information.
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(4.5.1) If w is constant on 
 and the playersArrow-Pratt measure of relative risk
aversion R d is increasing, then playerse¤ort decreases with the level of information
in T .
(4.5.2) If v is constant on 
 and the playersArrow-Pratt measure of relative risk
aversion R d is decreasing, then playerse¤ort increases with the level of information
in T .
Proof. We prove Proposition (4.5.1). Assume that R d is increasing, i.e., for all
x 2 R+ 
xd00(x)
d0(x)
0
 0:
Then 
1 +
xd00(x)
d0(x)
0
 0;
which implies
(2d00(x) + xd000(x)) d0(x)  d0(x)d00(x) + x (d00(x))2  0;
and therefore
2d00(x) + xd000(x) = (xd0(x))00  0
for all x 2 R+: Hence Proposition 4.5.1 follows from Proposition 4.4.1.
We prove Proposition (4.5.2). Assume that R d is decreasing. Hence
1 +
xd00(x)
d0(x)
0
 0:
Taking log in equation (12) we may write
ln s(a; b) + ln d0(s(a; b)) = ln
n  1
n2
+ ln a  ln b:
Setting a = 1 and di¤erentiating with respect b we get
 1
b
=
sb(1; b)
s(1; b)

1 +
s(1; b)d00(s(1; b))
d0(s(1; b))

:
Hence sb(1; b) < 0: Di¤erentiating this equation again with respect to b yields
1
b2
=
sbb(1; b)s(1; b)  sb(1; b)2
s(1; b)2

1 +
s(1; b)d00(s(1; b))
d0(s(1; b))

+
sb(1; b)
2
s(1; b)

1 +
s(1; b)d00(s(1; b))
d0(s(1; b))
0
:
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Since R d is decreasing, the second term in the right hand side is non-positive, and
therefore the rst term must be non-negative, i.e.,
sbb(1; b)s(1; b)  sb(1; b)2  0:
Hence sbb(1; b)  0: Thus D^(b) = D(1; b) = E(s(1; b)) is convex, since D^00(b) =
E(sbb(1; b))  0: Therefore playerse¤ort increases with the level of information in T
by Proposition 4.1.1. 
Finally, we present some applications and examples. In a symmetric common-
value classic Tullock contests with incomplete information the cost function of every
player i 2 N is ci(!; x) = x: Therefore the playersArrow-Pratt measure of relative
risk aversionR d is constant. Our next proposition is a direct consequence of Theorem
4.3 and Proposition 4.5.
Proposition 4.6. In every symmetric common-value classic Tullock contest with
incomplete information the value of public information is zero, and the playerse¤ort
is invariant to changes in the playersinformation.
The following examples provide other applications of our results.
Example 1. Assume that n = 2; 
 = f!1; !2g; p(!1) = p(!2) = 1=2, and let
d(x) = x2=2 + 2x: Then for x 2 R+,
R d(x) =
x
x+ 1
:
Therefore R0 d(x) > 0. Hence in every contest T 2 T (d) the value of public infor-
mation is positive. Moreover, if the playerscost of e¤ort is independent of the state
of nature, then their e¤ort decrease with the level of public information. However,
if the the cost of e¤ort depends on the state, then playerse¤ort may increase with
the level of information. An example with this feature is as follows: let the value be
v(!1) = v(!2) = 2; and let the multiplicative component of the cost be w(!1) = 1=6;
w(!2) = 1=48: Consider the contest T 2 T (d) in which the players have no infor-
mation about the state. Then equilibrium e¤orts are s(!1) = s(!2) =
p
57=3   1:
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Consider the contest T 0 2 T (d) in which the players have complete information about
the state. Then equilibrium e¤orts are s(!1) = 1 and s(!2) = 4; and therefore the
expected e¤ort is E(s) = 5=2 >
p
57=3  1: Hence the expected e¤ort increases with
the level of information in T .
Example 2. Assume that d(x) = x for all x 2 R+, where  > 1. Then for x 2 R+,
R d(x) =    1, and therefore R0 d(x) = 0. Hence in every contest T 2 T (d) the
value of public information in T is zero. However, since
(xd0(x))00 = 2(  1)x 2 > 0;
in every contest T 2 T (d) in which the cost of e¤ort is independent of the state of
nature players e¤ort decrease with the level of public information by Proposition
4.4.1.
5 Extensions
The results of sections 3 and 4 apply to a broader class of generalized symmetric
common-value Tullock contests with incomplete information in which the contests
success function  : 
Rn+ ! n is given by for i 2 N and (!; x) 2 
Rn+nf0g by
i(!; x) =
g(!; xi)Pn
j=1 g(!; xj)
;
where g : 
  R+ ! R+ is a score function such that for all ! 2 
; g(!; ) is
twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and concave, and satises g(!; 0) = 0. In the
Bayesian game associated with a contest Tg in this class, G(Tg), the payo¤ function
of each player i 2 N is given for all (!; x) 2 
 Rn+ by
ui(!; x) =
g(!; xi)Pn
j=1 g(!; xj)
v(!)  c(!; xi):
Since there is a bijection between the equilibria of the game G(Tg) and the game
G(T ); where T = (N; (
;F ; p); v; c^;G); with c^(!; ) = g 1(!; )  c(!; ) for all ! 2 
,
then changes in information in Tg have the same impact as in T .
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6 Appendix
Lemma. A symmetric common-value Tullock contest with complete information in
which the contenders cost of e¤ort is a twice di¤erentiable strictly increasing and
convex function c : R+ ! R+ such that c(0) = 0 has a unique (pure strategy) Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. Denote by v > 0 the contenders common value. We show that the n-
person complete information game in which the set of pure strategies of every player
is R+ and the payo¤ function of each player i 2 N is hi : Rn+ ! R+ given for
x 2 Rn+nf0g by
hi(x) =
xi
x
v   c(xi);
where x =
Pn
j=1 xj, and
hi(0) = iv   c(0) = iv;
where  2 n is predetermined, has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is symmetric.
Note that hi (; x i) is twice di¤erentiable and concave on Rn+nf0g. For x i 2
Rn 1+ nf0g player is optimal e¤ort solves the problem
max
xi2R+
hi (xi; x i) :
Di¤erentiating hi we get
@hi
@xi
=
x  xi
x2
v   c0(xi):
Write
'(x; xi) := (x  xi) v   x2c0(xi):
Note that
@'
@xi
=  x (2c0(xi) + xc00(xi)) < 0
for (xi; x i) 2 Rn+nf0g: If '(x; 0) = x (v   xc0(0))  0; then @hi=@xi  0 on R+; and
therefore player is optimal e¤ort is xi = 0: If '(x; 0) > 0; since '(x; x) =  x2c0(x) <
0 and @'=@xi < 0; then player is optimal e¤ort is the unique solution to the equation
'(x; xi) = 0:
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Clearly x = 0 2 Rn+ is not a Nash equilibrium: since n  2; then i < 1 for some
i 2 N; and therefore
hi(x) = iv < v   c(") = hi(x i; "):
for " > 0 su¢ ciently small.
Therefore a Nash equilibrium x 2 Rn+nf0g satises '(x; xi) = 0 for all i 2 N;
where x =
Pn
j=1 xj: Hence xi = xj for all i; j 2 N; and therefore x = (t; :::; t); where
t 2 R++ solves '(nt; t) = 0: Equivalently, t must solve the equation (t) = 0; where
(t) :=
'(nt; t)
t
= (n  1) v   n2tc0(t):
Note that (0) > 0 and 0(t) =  n2 (c0(t)) + tc00(t)) < 0: Moreover, since c is convex,
there is Q > 0 su¢ ciently large that Qc0(Q) > v; and therefore
(Q) = (n  1) v   n2Qc0(Q) < nv (1  n) < 0:
Hence the equation (t) = 0 has a unique solution t 2 R++; and therefore the unique
(pure strategy) Nash equilibrium is x = (t; :::; t).
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